

~~SECRET~~

29 NOV 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NSCIC Comments on India-Pakistan Study

1. The tentative agenda for the NSCIC meeting at 1700 hours on 29 November calls for a discussion of the NSCIC Working Group study, "Intelligence Support in Political-Military Crises: A Case Study of the India-Pakistan Crisis of 1971," and the five-page covering memorandum from the Working Group posing questions on which the NSCIC might provide guidance (Tab A).

2. Dr. Kissinger's office, on 11 October, requested comments on the study and memorandum from all NSCIC members by 15 November.

3. In your reply of 14 November (Tab B), you noted that you considered it inappropriate to respond to the questions raised in the Working Group memorandum because they are addressed primarily to consumers of intelligence. You stated that if copies of the responses of other members were provided to you prior to the NSCIC meeting on this subject, you could prepare comments from the viewpoint of the intelligence community.

4. None of these responses has been sent to us, but [redacted] has read the comments of Mr. Rush (summarized at Tab C) and Admiral Moorer (summarized at Tab D). The Attorney General's office reported he had no comments. Mr. Irwin had not signed the State Department response by 28 November, but the letter was described as concurring in the study and pointing to the need for better means of communication between the intelligence community and policy makers.

5. Dr. Kissinger's views on the study and its covering memorandum are not known. Andy Marshall's staff is drafting a memorandum for Dr. Kissinger which reportedly will emphasize the need for improved coordination on intelligence inputs, for greater use of national estimates during crisis periods, and for more attention to providing guidance to the intelligence community as to what is needed during international crises.

25X1
225X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

6. The conclusions in the India-Pakistan study differ from those in the usual study in that they pose a series of "issues," e.g., "How can the community insure that unevaluated intelligence reports are put in proper perspective?"

7. The NSCIC Working Group picked up this theme and in its covering memorandum posed a number of problems for NSCIC consideration as possible basis for guidance concerning:

a. Communication of intelligence needs from policy levels to the intelligence community.

b. Communication of intelligence judgments to policy levels.

c. Content and quality of the intelligence community response to policy level needs.

8. Views of other NSCIC members thus far available on issues raised in the NSCIC Working Group memorandum are as follows:

a. Should there be some focal point for development, coordination, and transmission of consumer intelligence needs to the intelligence community to improve intelligence responsiveness to important issues?

(1) Mr. Rush considers the WSAG Working Group (or "mini-WSAG") deserves more attention in this role and that it or the WSAG should have as a standing agenda item: "What should we ask the intelligence people?"

(2) Admiral Moorer considers "it is incumbent on the NSCIC and the intelligence community to solicit guidance when they find the need.", and that consideration should be given to formal expression of EEI by action-oriented bodies of the NSC.

b. Should there be more NIEs or ONE memoranda during lengthy crises? [redacted] 25X1
was the only national estimate during the India-Pakistan crisis.)

(1) Andy Marshall is urging Dr. Kissinger to say "yes".

SECRET

SECRET

c. Is there a need for special means of presenting key judgments, perhaps using executive summaries intended especially for personnel involved in making policy and operational decisions?

(1) Mr. Rush says "yes" if they represent the considered judgment of intelligence management and are not merely another digest of coordinated opinions.

d. Should there be planning for a real-time study of the handling and use of intelligence inputs in the NSC decision-making process during the actual evolution of a crisis situation?

(1) Mr. Rush considers this unrealistic.

e. Are policy-makers getting what they need in the way of analysis information on, and analysis of, the intentions of foreign governments?

(1) Admiral Moorer considers intelligence should deal with capabilities and not intentions.

f. Should raw intelligence be introduced directly into top level decision processes?

(1) Mr. Rush considers this useful--since the community cannot assess, digest and report on everything it receives, but can comment on the wheat to separate it from the chaff.

g. What should be the character of the procedures for supplying coordinated views during crisis periods? Should the DCI obtain more direct participation of DIA and INR in preparation of his briefing to WSAG and similar forums?

(1) Admiral Moorer feels the DCI (or DDCI) is the only acceptable representation at the NSC forum.

(2) Mr. Rush considers a procedure for advanced community coordination and comment on DCI presentations should be adopted, and that DCI presentations should not be "limited to unilateral CIA output" particularly when there are "variant" interpretations.

(3) Andy Marshall is suggesting Dr. Kissinger emphasize the need for improved coordination of intelligence inputs.

SECRET

9. It is likely that the discussion of the India-Pakistan study and its implications will be rather free-wheeling, depending in large measure on the approach taken by Dr. Kissinger -- on which we have no present guidance.

10. It is not unreasonable to expect, however, that Dr. Kissinger might pose the direct question to you: How much and what kind of guidance does the DCI actually want from the NSCIC?

(signed)

Bronson Tweedy
D/DCI/IC

Attachments:

Tabs A,B,C, and D

DCI/IC/PRG [] 29 Nov 1972

225X1

Distribution:

orig - DCI

1 - ER w/o attachments

1 - Mr. Tweedy

1 - PRG subject

1 - []

1 - PRG chrono

25X11